Why we need two public inquiries on the pandemic

The government appears to have adopted the Doctrine of Unripe Time in its attitude to a public inquiry on coronavirus: the time will always be inconvenient for such an inquiry. (Similar considerations apply, in its mind, to any investigation of the consequences of Brexit). However, there is a public need to know the origins of such a huge number of avoidable deaths ; and the many ways in which we can be better prepared for the future.

When the subject is considered, it must become clear quite soon that, in order for the inquiry to consider the diverse political, social, economic and environmental origins of the pandemic's consequences for Britain, the remit of an inquiry would be huge and it would take a considerable length of time to reach any conclusions. (The inquiries into the Iraq war and Bloody Sunday spring to mind in this connection). I would, therefore, propose two inquiries.

The first would examine government planning for pandemics since the start of this century. In particular, it would probe the question of the consequences of Exercise Cygmus in 2016, which was designed the state's preparedness for such a pandemic. This exercise in 'war-gaming' a pandemic demonstrated conclusively that the state was extremely ill prepared for such an outcome, but no action resulted. It would have to examine other areas of government policy (such as austerity and Brexit) and their impact on pandemic preparedness. The overriding question is: given that the British state has known for at least twenty years that such an outbreak was extremely likely, why was it not better prepared ? As the inquiry would investigate government policy and decision making over twenty years, it could not be accused of focussing on the actions of only one political party. Of course, such an inquiry would have to ask very searching questions about the period from the end of January to the middle of March 2020, when the prime minister was apparently 'missing in action', after the World Health Organisation had clearly indicated that there was a global health emergency, but it would have to delve more deeply into the past.

The second inquiry would have a much wider remit. It would examine the wider public health reasons for the devastating impact of the pandemic on many parts of Britain. It would look in detail at employment patterns, conditions of work, housing, environment, education, access to leisure facilities and outdoor spaces, and the impact of class and racial inequalities on health. The inquiry panel would not only consist of relevant scientific/medical expertise, but the widest possible representation from all parts of civil society. It would be particularly assiduous in ensuring that the composition of the panel represents those who are usually least heard. This panel would be expected to produce interim reports, but it would be more or less permanent, although its composition would change. It would oversee a Comprehensive Pandemic Preparedness Plan, which would be the subject of continual public debate.

The first inquiry would need to be statutory, and examine witnesses under oath, as it must establish responsibility for failures of government policy, in addition to drawing conclusions for the future. The second inquiry need not be statutory.

It cannot be assumed that this pandemic is a 'once in a lifetime' experience. As human society encroaches more and more on natural environments, more viruses will be released and cross species barriers. (For details see a book by the Swedish ecologist Andreas Malm, 'Corona, climate, chronic emergency' (2020) ). More of these viruses will be spread globally and become pandemics.

Whatever the nature of the inquiry, the public needs to be told what failed and why, and who was ultimately responsible. The government's tacit assumption that everybody wants to (and should) 'move on' and 'get back to normal' is beyond cynical and contemptible.