Over the past few weeks, a number of politicians have criticised the relationship between China and the WHO. Most notorious among these has been President Trump, whose criticism has, as always, been overtly and unashamedly racist. This sort of criticism needs to be exposed for the vile nonsense that it is.
However, in this post I am more concerned with discussing a more responsible and measured form of criticism, which has been made by a number of academics and pundits.This consists of two points: first, that China's system of government is crucial to explaining the suppression of the first reports of the outbreak ; and, second, that the World Health Organisation was too willing to believe the assurances of China's government concerning the outbreak. There are three points which I would like to make concerning these allegations.
First, the WHO depends for its existence on the contributions of its member states. When they ensure that the WHO is well funded, it can do great things, such as helping to eradicate smallpox in the 1970s. Conversely, its ability to act is constrained when its members are reluctant to cough up. Therefore, it cannot afford to alienate its members. In this, it is no different from other organisations, such as the World Bank, the UN or the EU (which is why criticisms of the EU as an autonomous bureaucratic despotism are way off the mark: its problem is that it is too slow to act, because it has to seek consensus. However, that is for another blogpost).
Second, the WHO declared the coronavirus pandemic a global health emergency on January 30th. This gave member states enough time to prepare, and to alter their pandemic preparedness strategies. By this time, the nature of the disease, as it had manifested itself in east Asia, was becoming apparent. The WHO cannot be accused of not having pointed to the danger of the pandemic.
Third, the finger has been repeatedly pointed at China for the emergence of various infectious diseases, including Sars. I am very far from being an expert on Chinese agricultural practices. However, this misses the point that the close contact between humans and animals entailed by the practice of agriculture since the Neolithic Revolution has also facilitated the regular transmission of disease from animals to humans (war and the movement of armies have also given a helping hand). As the historian William H McNeill put it so eloquently in his classic work, 'Plagues and peoples' (1976): 'from the point of view of other organisms, humankind... resembles an acute epidemic disease, whose occasional lapses into less virulent forms of behaviour have never yet sufficed to permit any really stable, chronic relationship to establish itself.' As humankind encroaches ever more on natural habitats in ever more destructive ways, the truth of this assertion, and the uncomfortable truth that it applies to humanity everywhere, and not just in China, is becoming ever more apparent.
None of the above criticisms are meant to exonerate China, but to point out that criticism of the WHO is misguided if it is not fully contextualised. It has no enforcement powers. It can advise, explain and help, all of which it is doing.
However, there is a wider point here about the responsibility of global superpowers, particularly the United States and China. The United States is still the dominant military power by a long way, but, in contrast with the period of the Cold War, is increasingly unwilling to take on the responsibilities of a superpower, for example, in funding international organisations such as the World Bank and the WHO. Over the past 70 years, these tensions have always been there, but US foreign policy since the start of this century has becoming increasingly unilateral. Similarly, China, despite its obvious ambitions for global power and influence, as demonstrated by the 'Belt and Road Initiative' and its many offshoots, has shown that it is unwilling to perform the role of global hegemon that the US will not, or cannot, undertake. As long as this situation continues, the WHO, dependent as it is on the commitment of its principal funders, will remain weak. As the examples of Spain in the 17th, the Ottoman Empire in the 19th, and Britain in the 20th century show, declining empires pose opportunities for rivals, in the form of war. However, that is for another blogpost.
A word of thanks to those who have taken the time to comment on the previous post, particularly Catherine, and her very relevant comments on social mores and public health, which I will consider in a later blogpost.