Some historical reflections on Britain's relationship with the EU

Historians who have analysed the chequered history of Britain's relationship with the EU (such as Hugo Young's 'This Blessed Plot' (2000) and David Reynolds' 'Island Stories' (2019) ) have often remarked that Britain's failure to enter the EU (or European Economic Community, or 'Common Market', as it then was) in the 1950s was a huge missed opportunity. It meant, according to them, that Brtain missed the opportunity to shape the EU in its own image, to ensure that it was not so biased toward the protection of French and German agricultural interests. It could be inferred from this argument that Britain was bound to have a difficult relationship with the EU, which would predispose it to leave at some point, because by the time Britain joined in 1973 the priorities of that organisation had already been established. A common complaint of Brexiters has often been that the implications of EU membership (in terms of its abrogation of 'sovereignty') were never properly explained at the time of accession. They imply that our membership of the EU was therefore based on systematic mendacity. However, as Hugo Young emphasises in his book, the EU's constitutional development toward federalism had stalled by the early 1970s, so the issue did not arise until the advent of Jacques Delors as President of the European Commission.

There is something in this argument. However, Britain's preoccupation with opt-outs has meant that it has been absent from managing many of the issues which have affected the EU (such as Greece's membership of the single currency). It does not follow that Britain has not made significant contributions to the EU's development. However, as the journalist and historian Fintan O'Toole pointed out in a perceptive piece in the 'Observer' in January, it has consistently been unable to recognise the implications of the changes which Britain proposed. For example, Thatcher proposed the Single Market in 1986, but was surprised and shocked when Jacques Delors pointed out that an inevitable consequence of the Single Market would have to be common labour and social standards. Indeed, this was the start of the Conservative Party's turn toward Europhobia. Similarly, the Major and Blair governments advocated the enlargement, or 'widening' of the EU to include the ex-Communist Central and Eastern European states, as an alternative to 'deepening' of the EU. However, they overlooked that the EU needed more central coordination as a consequence of enlargement, so that 'deepening' would inevitably accompany 'widening'.

The argument which was often deployed in favour of our retaining membership of the EU in the referendum in 1975 was that it would make the British economy more competitive. This was a powerful argument for a country which was grappling with the loss of its imperial markets. To paraphrase Dean Acheson, it found a role in the EU after the loss of empire, a role to which the United States had rather impatiently nudged it. The wave of 'deindustrialisation' which hit Britain during the Thatcher years was in part compensated by foreign investment which was greatly encouraged by our membership of the Single Market. Although this averted an even more serious crisis, and even more unemployment, it also averted attention from serious imbalances in the British economy, such as the dominance of the financial sector, which prospered under the Single Market. The EU's role in facilitating the settlement in Northern Ireland has often been remarked upon. However, the EU may also have indirectly blunted the appeal of Welsh and Scottish nationalism, partly because the EU was a useful source for funding for underdeveloped regions ; and partly because the EU was a countervailing power to an increasingly unresponsive and overbearing centralised British state. (It is also no coincidence that the political impact of Welsh and Scottish nationalism began to be felt in the decade after the demise of most of the British empire, but that is another story).

The most Europhobic elements in the Conservative Party (which, by 2016, constituted most of it) and UKIP appear to have become convinced by the middle of the last decade (and, perhaps, even before) that the EU was heading toward a 'superstate' in which British opt-outs would have no significance. It could be seen as a paradox that the Brexiters chose a solution in which Britain would have no influence in the EU. In fact, albeit at the cost of a reduced influence in the EU, the regime of British opt-outs gave it the best of both worlds : an ability to enjoy the benefits of the EU while circumventing irksome restrictions on 'sovereignty'.

Be that as it may, events since 2016 have decisively shown that the EU is not heading toward a superstate (a fact emphasised by Britain's refusing full diplomatic status to the EU's ambassador, although the British government probably had other motives). The much advertised problem concerning procurement of vaccines demonstrates this. The EU had decided to order vaccines from one German and one French company because it is not an independent administrative organism, but reflects the interests of the most dominant states, in this case France and Germany. Most strikingly, the aspiration, expressed by Macron, of a common European defence identity, is not being realised. That means the EU is nowhere near having the attribute which Max Weber thought essential for statehood, namely a 'monopoly of violence' in its own territory. Thus, the EU depends on NATO for defence ; yet is becoming economically closer to China, as the recently agreed Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) with China shows. There is a good rationale, separately, for depending on NATO, and for seeking a closer economic relationship with China. However, in an atmosphere of increasing tension between the United States and China, to maintain both policies at the same time requires a delicate juggling act.

The above caveats about the coherence of the EU should not overshadow the fact that, despite many predictions of its imminent demise over the past decade, it is still surviving, and indeed thriving. The recent EU stimulus package shows that the European Central Bank has loosened the reins of monetary orthodoxy, and is allowing joint borrowing and increased fiscal transfers. This will reduce regional economic disparities within the EU, and bind it closer together. However, as the vaccine episode demonstrates, international solidarity beyond Europe's borders is a different matter. The EU has helped to ensure that patent restrictions on vaccines remain, thereby restricting access by the Global South to them.

To sum up, the fears of Brexiters concerning a superstate and the hopes of many idealistic Remainers concerning the potential of the EU to be an exemplar of supranational internationalism are both misplaced. That does not make the case for the existence of the EU, and for Britain's eventually re-joining it, any the less compelling. The EU is still a going concern.