The historical origins of Trumpism (5)

After having drawn attention to the sharp and unyielding division in American politics between a regimented Republican Party and the diverse Democrats (thus conforming to the historic model of an American political party), it might seem paradoxical to point out that Trumpism was in fact the product of a striking degree of ideological convergence between the two parties, and of the consequent frustration of many Americans with this situation. However, I am going to propose precisely this argument.

A simple political fact has to be borne in mind, the implications of which are often overlooked. Despite the obvious trend to an ideological monoculture in the Republican Party, it has to appeal to diverse groups of voters. It could never win elections by appealing solely to upper middle class 'country club' Republicans, or fiscal conservatives, or Christian evangelicals. It has always had to appeal to 'blue collar' voters. The contribution of Trumpism has been to graft economic nationalism, nativism and isolationism on to the New Right's preoccupations, namely deregulation, reducing taxes for the wealthy, protecting corporate interests, high defence expenditure ; and, in foreign policy Christian Zionism (as evidenced by Trump's and Pompeo's close relationship with Netanyahu). Therefore, Trump supplied something which was missing from the electoral appeal of the Bushes, John McCain and Mitt Romney.

It is important to emphasise that much of the dispute between Democrats and Republicans has centred on 'culture war' issues (e.g. abortion ; capital punishment ; affirmative action), and not on economic issues. Despite their pro-labour rhetoric, the Democrats have not rolled back anti-labour legislation from Reagan onwards. Until Biden, from the early 1970s onwards the Democrats had effectively abandoned the pro-labour, pro-welfare policies which they had embraced from the New Deal through to the Great Society (See Thomas Frank, 'What's the matter with Kansas ?' (2004), 'Listen, liberal' (2016) ; Steve Fraser (ed.) 'The rise and fall of the New Deal order' (1989) ). Similarly, to many Americans, both parties had pursued policies of military intervention. As a result of Nixon's abolition of the draft in 1972, the experience of military life became sharply differentiated by class (Andrew Bacevich, 'The new American militarism' (2005)). Working class Americans went away to fight, and they felt forgotten. It is not surprising that those at the sharp end of 'deindustrialisation' and military service abroad turned to Trumpism.