Commentators appear to have decided that Biden is continuing Trump's policy toward China. That is not quite true: Biden's commitment to de-carbonisation and the recognition that the climate crisis is an urgent problem require his administration to co-operate with China on this issue (and others, including cybersecurity) , but, for other reasons, be antagonistic toward China on others, such as military competition and China's territorial claims in the South China Sea. Trade policy is another area where continuities with Trump are apparent. Biden appears to have decided, not unreasonably, that in an age of incipient economic nationalism he cannot be the only adherent to free trade. Biden has become more antagonistic to Russia, but it was never clear (even to Trump) what Trump's policy toward Russia was. The withdrawal from Afghanistan is another clear commitment from the Trump area which Biden has retained. This will potentially present geopolitical opportunities to Russia and China (and to Turkey and India), although this is clearly not Biden's intention, his decision having been motivated by domestic political concerns. Biden has put some pressure on Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to end the murderous war in Yemen, although it is very clear that this does not extend to arms sales to either of these two states, or to Sisi's murderous regime in Egypt. (For details see William Hartung's recent 'TomDispatch' blogpost, produced by 'The Nation' magazine).
It is true that Biden recognises the importance of the EU and NATO to American national security interests, but he will continue to lecture NATO (although in far more diplomatic language than Trump) that its members need to increase their military expenditures ; and Biden will prove a tough negotiating partner for the EU in the area of economic diplomacy. Even at the height of 'multilateralism', at the time of the Truman administration's Marshall Plan, there were many strings attached to America's economic aid. There was never a golden age of 'multilateralism', nor is it reasonable to expect there to have been, given the United States' interests as an imperial power. The United States is determined to remain a global military power, with all that that entails in expenditure on bases and 'hardware', but at the same time is becoming more unilateralist. This trend started under George W. Bush. Trump was certainly not a complete aberration : he pursued these foreign and military policies to extremes, and in an incoherent way ; but the contradictions of American foreign policy existed before Trump.
The recent cyber-attack on the oil pipeline in America and the persistent drought in parts of the United States indicate how lop-sided American national security policy is (although it is far from alone in this). It far out-spends its nearest rivals in all sorts of military hardware, but cannot protect crucial parts of its own infrastructure, or protect its own environment. There is no doubt that Biden and the Pentagon are keenly aware of these problems. It is less clear what they intend to do about it. His de-carbonisation plans, though a very obvious departure from Trump's antagonism to scientific evidence, are not far-reaching enough.
Biden's proclaimed commitment to 'human rights' is evident in his policies towrd Tigray and Myanmar, although much less so in Israel's case, where the United States has much more influence bit chooses not to exert it. Netanyahu is, in fact, in a very weak position (he has just been rejected by most of the Israeli electorate, and has criminal charges hanging over him), and the Biden administration could make life very difficult for him if it chose to. Instead, the administration is continuing Trump's policy in re-locating the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, in blocking United Nations resolutions which are critical of Netanyahu's policies, and in refusing to condemn the illegal occupation of the West Bank. (Any influence which the United States may have had over the Palestine Authority has been negated by Trump's inhumane decision to cut aid. And it has no influence over Hamas and Islamic Jahid because they are proscribed as terrorist organisations). Again, Trump's policy toward Israel was an exaggeration of pre-existing American partiality. not a wholly new departure. The problem for Biden is that he has decided to depart significantly from Trump's policy toward Iran, and has decided on a limited rapprochement. Given Israel's continued low-level conflict with Iran (Israel's probable attack on the Natanz nuclear facility, and its attacks on Iranian soldiers in Syria), it will be very difficult for Biden both to be close to Israel and to mend relations with Iran. However, as he must be acutely aware, there is not much time left before the situation could become much worse. It is dangerously complacent to assume that the present conflict in Israel/Palestine, terrible as it already is, could not become a more general war. The whole of West Asia is smouldering.