Some more anxious reflections on Biden ; or, the possible breakdown of international order

It is still possible to feel such relief at the (temporary) passing of Trump from the political scene that one overlooks the fact that Biden is attempting the restoration of an international order which was in itself unstable. Thus, it is more than probable that the United States is withdrawing its forces from Afghanistan so that it is better able to continue, or commence, equally wasteful, violent and unsuccessful 'counterinsurgency' operations elsewhere, in the Greater Middle East or in Africa, albeit increasingly with drone and other 'artificial intelligence' technology. There was, in any case, a powerful domestic imperative for Biden's decision. Much of Trump's support derived from those parts of the American electorate who supply much of the personnel for the armed forces, and who had run out of patience with this particular apparently open-ended commitment. The Afghanistan decision is not the start of a new strategy, but merely the 're-calibration' of an existing one, in a vain attempt to reduce its costs to a 'sustainable' level.

So, Biden still intends to be bellicose, but his bellicosity will affect other parts of the world. At present, the United States is increasingly engaged in a dangerous stand-off with China in the South China Sea, where China has been fortifying islands (e.g. the Spratleys) or building entirely new islands, and is obviously determined to counter american hegemony ; a similar trial of strength is taking place in Ukraine. Convincing arguments can be assembled as to which power is more to 'blame' for these areas of antagonism ; but that is not the point of this argument. Since the Cold War, the United States has been determined to hold on to its 'unipolar moment' (in the words of the neoconservative commentator Charles Krauthammer), and can brook no challenge to its military dominance over most of the globe. Those areas, such as Syria, where Russia has gained a foothold, are deemed too costly for American interventions to be contemplated. However, the United States is being challenged ; because international economic relationships are changing, and with them, the balance of military power. Although the United States is determined to continue to spend vast sums on its military, its 'unipolar moment' is no longer assured.

Is the international order stable enough to contain these tensions. With the enchantment of historical distance, people often look back at the Cold War, and view it as an entirely atypical period of historical stability. However, that is not borne out by the historical evidence. The period from 1945 to 1962 was a time of extreme tension, when fears of nuclear confrontation were very real, and by no means confined to the various peace movements. In 1962 the nail-biting experience of the Cuban missile crisis convinced politicians and officials that the international system, even with the dubious support of nuclear 'deterrence', was unstable, and needed urgent attention. The establishment of a 'hot line' between the White House and the Kremlin was one consequence of this recognition ; another was the steady stream of arms control, test ban, and anti-proliferation treaties from 1963 until 1996. This process kept the principal antagonists in the Cold War talking. Of course, this did not prevent other 'near misses', such as the Yom Kippur war (1973), or NATO's Able Archer exercise in 1983, where the Soviet Union came close to a catastrophic misinterpretation of NATO's actions ; neither did it prevent a series of violent struggles in the Global South, where wars of 'decolonisation' were inevitably deeply coloured by the global nature of the Cold War (e.g. Vietnam). However, the fact that channels of communication were in being probably helped to prevent matters from becoming even worse. At present, such channels have atrophied, and the major powers are no longer talking about arms control. Trump's actions in this area of policy were merely a culmination of years of dangerous neglect by all sides. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the majpr powers are not realy talking to each other at all, except through megaphones.

Contrary to popular misconception, nuclear 'deterrence', whatever oe thinks of its practical consequences, is not some mystical essence which ensures the absence of a nuclear conflagration. It exists in a world of human frailty, of fear, anxiety, pride, and sometimes fatal misunderstanding, all of which played parts in the outbreak of WW1. Therefore, conscious actions need to be taken to reduce the impact of these human weaknesses on the international system. As long as there is communication, there is hope for a more durable and peaceful international order.