'Moving on' from Brexit ; or, the return of the repressed in Northern Ireland (and Scotland)

The seasoned expert in opinion polling, Peter Kellner, has some interesting data about the vicissitudes in public opinion in England on Brexit in the current issue of the 'New European'. Apparently, previous Remainers are increasingly 'moving on' from the issue of Brexit and accepting it as a fait accompli, although this may be another fluctuation in opinion among the British, many of whom are still very uncertain about the issue, or, to be more precise, hold one definite opinion one day about Brexit, and hold the opposite the next week. Although the 'Brexit' and 'Remain' blocs remain relatively stable, the all-important 'floaters' are still very much 'floating.'

There has been a perceptible rise in support for Brexit. The reason is that the success in vaccination in Britain 'proves' the wisdom of our having exited from the EU, despite the fact that most European countries are projected to have vaccinated most of their most vulnerable groups by the end of the summer, and that early Continental scepticism about the (relative) health dangers of vaccines has been borne out by the British authorities. (However, this relates to the important subject of calculating risk, which, if I ever feel up to trespassing the sacred territories of other academic disciplines, may be a subject for a future blogpost).

Kellner's findings are, when you pause for a moment to consider them, quite astounding. Scotland edges towards an independence referendum ; Northern Ireland is experiencing serious civil disorder (admittedly for many reasons not related to Brexit, although Brexit is undoubtedly an important factor) ; support for independence for Wales is increasing markedly ; relations between Britain and the EU are deteriorating sharply ; the supposedly 'fantastic' deal between Britain and the EU has not yet even been approved by the European Parliament ; businesses are tottering on the brink of a precipice ; science funding is in peril because Britain is not replacing the missing funding from the EU....I could continue. But, despite all this, the English are coming to the conclusion that Brexit is a success. What is going on ?

Part of the explanation lies in the culpable negligence of the media. One can expect nothing less from the rabidly Europhobic press: for over thirty years they have embraced these opinions enthusiastically, and they have never let inconvenient facts get in their way. But the BBC, for reasons which are not entirely surprising, is seriously failing to meet its public service obligations on this issue (see my previous blogpost entitled, 'Why is the BBC not talking about Brexit ?') Many people believe that Brexit believe that Brexit is a success because the BBC is not informing them : they do not know about the damage that is being done to employment, culture or research, or to countless other areas of our national life. (The advent of GB News can only make matters worse in this regard).

However, a large part of the reason lies in the uncomfortable fact that many English people do not care about the other nations of the Union. They have never particularly cared about Northern Ireland, and, to the extent that they did care, regarded the issue of the Six Counties as having been 'done' by the Good Friday Agreement. More disgracefully, British governments from 1921 to 1969 knowingly let grievances and injustices fester until it was too late. Since 2010, after a period of forty years when the British state's loss of its monopoly of violence in Northern Ireland compelled its attention, the British government has relapsed. Austerity and Brexit have exacerbated existing tensions ; Theresa May's alliance with the DUP did not help matters, neither does Alexander de Pfeffel's willful insouciance. However, a more fundamental reason lies in English misperceptions of the Good Friday Agreement, and what it did, and did not accomplish.

The most important achievement of the GFA has been the successful political management of collective sectarian disappointments. That is not to diminish its success ; it is only to state that a realistic appraisal of the GFA must inevitably encompass an appreciation of the limitations of politics in Northern Ireland. Both communities are still separated by geography, education, employment patterns, and mutual suspicions ; paramilitary organisations still exist, and are becoming more active ; there are many unresolved questions from the era of the Troubles, which further embitter political and social relationships ; policing is still a very political question. Deindustrialisation, particularly the decline of shipbuilding, has hit the area hard. (Of course, in future, because of Brexit, much-needed EU funding will be absent to assist economic revival. If, in future, Ireland is 'united', the Republic of Ireland could request the EU for regional aid for the Six Counties, though, given the many other calls on its budget, it is far from clear that such subventions would be forthcoming.)

The GFA embodies the assumption that the political aspirations of one community will never be accepted by the other, and that this inherently fragile situation has to be managed. The GFA was not an endpoint ; it was only a signpost in a tortuous historical process. The presence of the EU as guarantor was essential, because it was a way of keeping the plural and conflicting political identities in the Six Counties in balance. Alexander's studied indifference toward Northern Ireland is unsustainable ; however, it is not surprising, as it is a reversion to an earlier lethal indifference of British governments, as encapsulated by Reginald Maudling's notorious comment: 'What a bloody awful country !' As so often in the past, the problems that the rest of Britain prefers to ignore, or repress, are writ large in Ireland. In particular, the problem of their own imperialism, which the British have never confronted, has come back to bite, again and again, in Ireland,.

Alexander's government has adopted a different policy toward Scotland. It apparently seeks to maintain the Union by deliberately antagonising the Scottish people. As the government's strategy paper on defence policy, 'Global Britain in a Competitive Age', makes clear, the British state will locate certain defence facilities in Scotland (and, of course, the ultimate absurdity of Trident will remain there). It is quite conceivable that the government could refuse a referendum on grounds of national security. This would serve the 'culture war' dimension of its Scotland policy by maintaining a constant state of antagonism and low-level conflict with the Scottish government, a state of affairs which Holyrood may welcome, while keeping an iron grip on Scotland. Scottish people provided much of the personnel of the British Empire ; now an old imperial poer, long in the tooth, but still intent on maintaining its great power pretensions, strikes back, by installing the symbols of its ridiculous globe-strutting in Scotland.