If a government is in power for too long, it is generally agreed that it becomes complacent and prone to corruption. If its tenure of power is not endangered by a strong opposition, these tendencies are exacerbated. It used to be assumed that such a government would (eventually) suffer the revenge of the voters. This may no longer be the case.
As I have noted in previous blogposts, Johnson's ratings in the opinion polls appear to have been almost entirely untouched by his terrible performance ; and, had it not been for the horrible consequences of the pandemic, it is extremely likely that Trump would have been re-elected. As far as Sturgeon is concerned, I have no idea whether the allegations that have been made are true, and a discussion of them is not my purpose here.
The following, however, are facts and in the public domain. The Scottish government's stewardship of the services provided by government (housing, health, education) is less than impressive. It has recently admitted that problems of substance abuse are very significant in parts of Scotland, and yet has been ineffective in dealing with these over a number of years. Efforts to deal with Scotland's feudal structure of land ownership have not been greeted with universal acclaim. The SNP's handling of the pandemic has not been markedly better, so far, than that of the UK government: Sturgeon is, however, better at communicating her government's policies, and the reasons behind them, than is Johnson. Yet, at the moment, the opposition parties in Scotland are very weak, and have not much hope of displacing the SNP. (Events may prove this assertion to be completely wrong. My own political commentary is not at all immune to the dangers which attend all other attempts at writing in this genre: it can be made to look very foolish and very superficial very quickly).
I admit that none of these are criminal acts : yet it is surprising that this record of mediocrity is not at all reflected in the opinion polls. Support for both the SNP and Scottish independence are strong. It is entirely understandable that animosity to Brexit and to Johnson have stimulated this support. However, there are many practical questions to be asked about independence: these are not only economic and constitutional. Central to the SNP's assumptions concerning independence is the belief that the EU will be ready to admit it to membership. It is, however, very likely that Spain would veto such an application. It has fears that an approval of Scotland's application would encourage Catalonia's secessionists. These practical questions doe not seem to have intruded on Scottish perceptions of the realities of independence. It is relevant to note that one of the several serious divisions within the SNP relates to independence : the supporters of Sturgeon favour a more gradual approach. This may well be because the interests of the governing faction of the SNP lie less in achieving independence than in keeping the issue in being as a vexatious boil which refused to be lanced, a position with which the Westminster government may well tacitly concur.
It has often been claimed that voters have become very fickle and capricious. That may well be true. However, something else may be happening as well: that people's political allegiances are becoming solidified along cultural, or 'tribal', lines, and that people's voting intentions, in significant ways, are entirely unaffected by ephemeral considerations of administrative competence, or of integrity. This may well account for the entrenched nature of both the Scottish nationalists in Edinburgh and the English nationalists in Westminster, and for the enhanced likelihood of increasing tensions within the United Kingdom. This is yet more evidence that Brexit is not 'done', and will continue to reverberate.
I intend to write explore the historical origins of the movement for Scottish independence in future blogposts.