There has been much talk about 'Global Britain' since 2016. It seems to be the guiding principle behind our post-Brexit foreign policy. So perhaps it is time to analyse its component parts. Some of these dimensions are more obvious than others ; all have comprised the unspoken, although not always overt, assumptions of British foreign policy for many years. In the public pronouncements of some of its most outspoken advocates, notably the prime minister, this concept is supposed to 'liberate' Britain from the 'stifling' embrace of the EU.
First, 'Global Britain' encompasses Britain's openness as an economy, to trade and investment flows. In particular, this refers to the lop-sided dominance of the City of London and its financial institutions in the domestic economy. In the eyes of the proponents of 'Global Britain', this drawback is offset by the advantage of the City's global connections. This aspect of 'Global Britain' has been underlined on the emphasis, initiated by Cameron, on using the FCO as a commercial arm of the British government, to secure advantage for Britain in international trade. This tendency has been continued by Johnson, particularly in the merger of the Department of International Development with the Foreign Office. Whatever you think of the effectiveness of bilateral aid, this merger clearly signifies the subordination of aid to commercial imperatives (which were, arguably, always present anyway).
Second, in a re-vamped conception of the 'special relationship' with the United States, the 'Anglosphere' (embracing the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) is often seen as an alternative power bloc to the EU.
Third, in order to avoid the racist implications of thee 'Anglosphere' policy , the Commonwealth is mentioned as a source of British power, and those magic 'trade deals.'
Fourth, under Cameron and Osborne, relationships with East Asia, particularly China, were seen as offering Britain both political and economic connections.
Fifth, in keeping with Britain's self-image as a pre-eminent naval power, both the May and Johnson governments have emphasised 'power projection', or, to follow the terminology of the International Relations scholar Joseph Nye, 'hard power'. Selling arms to 'friendly' and despotic regimes in conflict situations (e.g. Saudi Arabia) is perhaps part of this, though usually unacknowledged.
Sixth, sometimes, to use Professor Nye's terminology again, the 'soft power' (i. e. cultural, intellectual and humanitarian) dimensions of Britain overseas are emphasised (e.g. the BBC, the British Council, universities, especially thoise with overseas campuses, touring theatre companies, popular music, etc).
Seventh, the concept of 'Global Britain' could refer to the multicultural nature of our own society, and the many 'informal' connections that have been established, in the realm of civil society, with many parts of the world. However, official discourse rarely emphasises this. Perhaps this is not surprising, in view of the fact that Britain (along with many other nation states) has difficulty in recognising the fact that multiple cultures also mean multiple histories and identities.
Eighth. Perhaps most absurdly, Britain, according to a widely held assumption, 'gave' concepts of democracy, pluralism, technology, 'fair play' , tolerance, etc etc to a grateful and benighted world, and still holds copyright on them.
It is stating the obvious to suggest that the concept of 'Global Britain' is in a bad way. The financial global importance of the City of London is imperilled by our departure from the EU (whatever the terms of the 'deal'). Not surprisingly, Australia and New Zealand have moved into the East Asian economic orbit. Our ability to conclude commercial agreements with other parts of the world is jeopardised by our apparent inability to see other states' perspectives, and by our assumption that Britain is God's gift to the world (as exemplified by May's refusal to relax immigration restrictions on students from India while expecting trade concessions from the Indian government, as if we were still some sort of imperial power). We do not have the resources to be a military and naval world power on our own.
The debacle over China is in a class of its own. The assumption that democratic and pluralist institutions would follow the development of capitalism (albeit, on the East Asian model) state supervised was a delusion common to all 'Western' nation states. However, Britain, with its peculiarly relaxed attitude to foreign ownership of economic assets, has made itself particularly vulnerable to China. (This is not a xenophobic point: other comparable countries, such as France and Germany, more alive to the needs of national economic resilience, have much more strict rules on foreign ownership. Interestingly, the EU, for all its 'neoliberalism', has not prevented this.)
When Cameron and Osborne were interested in forging commercial relationships with China, the 'ethnic cleansing' of the Uighurs was known, as was the existence of slave labour in China, as were China's 'revanchist' ambitions toward Taiwan and Hong: these facts are not new. The factor that has changed is that the United States now regards China as not only an economic, but also a security, threat. In its desperate clinging to a now defunct 'special relationship' (if it ever existed) with the United States, Britain has committed yet another act of violence against its own economy, alongside that of exiting the EU. My point is that a lack of a long-term strategic plan for both our economy and our foreign relations is to blame, not whether Sweden, Finland or China (in the form of Huawei) is a better supplier of technical equipment.
The decision to leave the EU was a foreign policy error of truly historic proportions. Oddly enough, so myopic has British political opinion become, the foreign policy implications have been rarely discussed after the referndum. Even more catastrophically, no strategic thinking seems to have happened in Whitehall on this subject, so understandably consumed has the civil service been with the process of Brexit. (Cummings' much-vaunted reforms, or 'creative destruction', of the civil service will not rectify this situation, only exacerbate it).
It is often said that the EU is irrevocably split, that it has had its day (how many times has that been said in the past ten years, yet the EU is still here ?), and that Britain's membership of NATO, the G7 and the UN Security Council will compensate, However, these organisation are as fissiparous as the EU, and their continued existence is no more guaranteed than that of the EU. These fevered self-assurances cannot conceal the fact that Britain is dancing in the dark, and alone. As historians of Britain's foreign relations in the 20th century (Hugo Young, 'This blessed plot' (1999) and David Reynolds, 'Britannia overruled'(2000)) indicate, a major factor in Britain's tentative steps toward the Common Market (through EFTA) was Eden's humiliation over Suez, which convinced Macmillan to 'rebalance' Britain's foreign policy.
Come to think of it, the continued existence of the United Kingdom is no longer guaranteed. The high-handed relationship of the May and Johnson governments with the devolved governments over Brexit and then over the pandemic crisis has exacerbated tensions. Even if Scotland does not become independent, there could well be a Catalonia situation, of a prolonged and embittered 'stand off', with nothing being resolved. However, that is something for another blogpost.